John Carter v. Jeffrey Beard by unknown
2010 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-26-2010 
John Carter v. Jeffrey Beard 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010 
Recommended Citation 
"John Carter v. Jeffrey Beard" (2010). 2010 Decisions. 706. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010/706 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2010 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PSM-167 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS







JEFFREY BEARD, Secretary of Corrections, Department of Corrections; WILLIAM
CARNUCHE; LANCE COUTURIER; WILLIAM HARRISON; DR. FRED MAUE;
JOHN MCCULLOUGH; WILLIAM STICKMAN
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 05-cv-1949)
District Judge:  Honorable William W. Caldwell 
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 6, 2010
Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. and VAN ANTWERPEN , Circuit Judges





John Carter appeals pro se from the United States District Court for the Middle
Because Carter does not advance any argument concerning the District1
Court’s May 19, 2006 order dismissing Secretary Jeffrey Beard as a defendant, we will 
not review that order. 
2
District of Pennsylvania’s August 31, 2009 entry of judgment against him.   For the1
reasons that follow, we will vacate the District Court’s order and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Carter is a Pennsylvania state prisoner.  In 2005, he commenced an action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against various employees of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
(“the defendants”).  Carter alleged that his due process rights were violated because he
was transferred into the prison’s Special Management Unit (“SMU”) without a hearing or
the opportunity to challenge his indefinite placement in the SMU. 
Carter was first placed in the SMU at the State Correctional Institution (“SCI”)-
Greene in October 2000 after accumulating more than 1,800 days of disciplinary time
while housed in the general population and in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”).  In
December 2001, Carter was transferred to SCI-Pittsburgh’s RHU in administrative
custody status, where he stayed until October 1, 2003.  At that time, because he had
exhibited disruptive behavior in the RHU, he was transferred back to the SCI-Greene
SMU.  Carter asserts, and the defendants do not argue otherwise, that his October 2003
transfer occurred without written notice or a hearing.  From October 1, 2003 through
March 2, 2007, Carter was moved between numerous prisons but always remained in the
SMU.  Then, in March 2007, he was transferred to the RHU at SCI-Smithfield because
The defendants also argued that any claim based on events that occurred2
prior to September 21, 2003 was time-barred under Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of
limitation.  See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5524.  Carter agreed that only his 2003
placement and subsequent stay in the SMU were at issue.  
3
“he was considered to be an SMU failure.” 
The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that Carter’s transfer to
and confinement in the SMU did not trigger a protected liberty interest, and thus that his
due process rights had not been implicated.   The defendants described the SMU program2
as an “opportunity” for the inmates to teach themselves discipline and pro-social skills so
as to co-exist peacefully with people from other backgrounds.  The SMU consists of five
phases—phase five being the most restrictive and reserved for those in disciplinary
custody.  As the inmate progresses through the phases, he obtains access to privileges and
services.  According to the Inmate Handbook, an inmate in the SMU is reviewed by his
Unit Team every thirty days.  The Unit Team determines, by a “vote sheet,” whether it is
appropriate to move the inmate into the next phase of the SMU program.  The Handbook
indicates that because the SMU is a “behavioral driven program,” the longer the inmate is
“unsuccessful,” “the longer [he or she] will remain in the program.”  It noted, however,
that it is expected that inmates will complete all phases of the program within two years,
and that if no progress is seen in the initial 12-to-18 months, then the Unit Team may
transfer the inmate to a Long Term Segregation Unit or RHU. 
In response to the summary judgment motion, Carter filed a brief and submitted
4declarations from himself and one other inmate asserting that the Inmate Handbook does
not accurately represent the SMU’s actual conditions or review process.  In addition to
restrictions on telephone usage, visitation, and various prison services, Carter described
being confined to his cell (where the lights are allegedly never turned off) for 23 hours
per day and alleged, among other things, that meals were withheld as a method of
punishment.
The District Court granted the defendants’ summary judgment motion based on its
conclusion that, even assuming that Carter’s SMU confinement triggered a liberty
interest, the monthly reviews satisfied the prison’s due process obligations.  This appeal
followed.   
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review de
novo the District Court’s entry of summary judgment.  Pennsylvania Coal Ass’n v.
Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 A prisoner’s procedural due process rights are violated when he is deprived of a
legally cognizable liberty interest, which occurs when the prison “imposes atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” 
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).  When considering whether segregated
housing triggers a legally cognizable liberty interest, courts must consider:  (1) the
duration of the confinement, and (2) the conditions of that confinement in relation to
The District Court also determined that Carter’s claim that he was entitled3
to a pre-transfer hearing was meritless.  Carter does not challenge this decision, and we
note that, under Hewitt, the prison was “obligated to engage only in an informal,
nonadversary review of the information supporting respondent’s administrative
confinement, including whatever statement respondent wished to submit, within a
reasonable time after confining him to administrative segregation.”  459 U.S. at 472
(emphasis added).  
5
other prison conditions.  Id. at 486-87.  If there is a liberty interest that has been adversely
affected by administrative segregation, we have held that the prison meets its due process
obligations if it provides meaningful, periodic reviews of the prisoner’s placement in
segregation.  See Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 145-47 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying Hewitt
v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), overruled in part by, Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 572
(1995)). 
Here, the District Court “assum[ed], without deciding, that the extended duration
of Carter’s SMU confinement . . . did spark a due process interest.”  See Shoats, 213 F.3d
at 144.   We will proceed on the same assumption and express no opinion as to whether a3
liberty interest was triggered.  
The District Court then determined that the SMU’s monthly reviews were
sufficient to protect Carter’s due process rights and that his declaration was inadequate to
defeat summary judgment.  See id at 145-46 (discussing administrative segregation 
monthly reviews).  Carter, however, had no opportunity to develop a factual record on the
issue of whether he received adequate process (i.e., meaningful periodic reviews during
his confinement in administrative segregation) because he had no notice that the District
The failure to raise this ground below does not preclude the defendants4
from raising it on remand.  If the record is fully developed on this issue, it may well be
that summary judgment is appropriate.
6
Court intended to consider dismissing his complaint on this basis.  See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56©; Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1069 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding
that a district court may sua sponte grant summary judgment only if it gives parties notice,
so that the parties may “marshall [their] evidence to show that there is a genuine issue of
material fact”).  The defendants did not raise this issue in their summary judgment
motion, and “[a] party has no obligation to respond to grounds that the moving party does
not raise in a summary judgment motion.”  Sealey v. Giltner, 116 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir.
1997); see also Edwards v. Honeywell, Inc., 960 F.2d 673, 674 (7th Cir. 1992).  The
defendants’ current argument that Carter had notice of the issue by the mere fact that the
Handbook (which stated that reviews occurred) was in the record is unavailing, and
Carter must be given an opportunity to develop additional facts relevant to this analysis.  4
Based on the foregoing, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand
for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
